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As our society massively relies on ICT, security services are 
becoming essential to protect users and entities involved. 
Amongst such services, non-repudiation provides evidences of 
actions, protects against their denial, and helps solving 
disputes between parties. For example, it prevents denial of 
past behaviors as having sent or received messages. 
Noteworthy, if the information flow is continuous, evidences 
should be produced for the entirety of the flow and not only at 
specific points. Further, non-repudiation should be guaranteed 
by mechanisms that do not reduce the usability of the system or 
application. To meet these challenges, in this paper, we propose 
two solutions for non-repudiation of remote services based on 
multi-biometric continuous authentication. We present an 
application scenario that discusses how users and service 
providers are protected with such solutions. We also discuss the 
technological readiness of biometrics for non-repudiation 
services: the outcome is that, under specific assumptions, it is 
actually ready. 
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continuous authentication, protocol, biometric signature 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
pervades modern society to the extent that we massively rely on 
it from private life to business. Today, users and operators can 
share confidential data, perform financial transactions, or 
remotely execute critical operations in real-time. However, the 
need for security has gone hand in hand with the technological 
progress, and our reliance on ICT strictly depends on it. 
Between others, authentication and non-repudiation are 
two of the security services that may be considered essential in 
many contexts and applications.  
Authentication is the process that provides assurance in the 
claimed identity of an entity [7]. Traditionally, it is a 
verification process based on pairs of username and password,  
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and it is performed as a single-occurrence during the login 
phase. However, some critical ICT systems and applications 
need to be secured for the entire session, possibly without 
overly disturbing the user. Therefore, solutions based on 
biometric continuous authentication have been studied in 
literature [16]-[21]. Those approaches shift user identity 
verification from a single-occurrence to a continuous process; 
relatively recent solutions are able to transparently acquire 
biometric data to perform authentication without significantly 
reducing the system usability [3], [17], [18]. 
The ability to undeniably demonstrate that users or entities 
requested specific services or performed certain actions is also 
useful. In fact, when a dispute arises or an error occurs people 
may attempt to deny their involvement and to repudiate their 
behavior. For instance, customers may disclaim a withdrawal 
from their account, or a payment with their own credit card, 
that they actually did. According to The New York Times, 0.05 
percent of MasterCard transactions worldwide are subjects of 
disputes, that probably means around 15 million questionable 
charges per year [22]. 
In addition to users denying their usage of a service, there 
have been cases of malicious operators or disreputable service 
providers. One example is a fraudulent or inaccurate web 
service for online stock trading: a broker is instructed by a 
customer to buy or sell stocks, or to follow a particular 
investment strategy, but retards the process in order to help 
other investors have their trades executed quickly [39], causing 
a consistent loss of money for the client. Then, the trader 
denies the involvement. 
The two above are both examples of repudiation, which can 
be defined as the denial of having participated in all or part of 
an action by one of the entities involved [4]. Consequently, 
non-repudiation is the ability to protect against such denial. A 
non-repudiation mechanism has to provide evidences in order 
to clarify responsibilities and guarantee the establishment of 
the facts even in front of a court of law. Therefore, a non-
repudiation service can be useful both as a mean to obtain 
accountability as well as a deterrent for deliberate 
misbehaviors. In the two situations reported above, a non-
repudiation mechanism would prevent that the fraudulent 
customer succeeds in denying a transaction or would help an 
innocent client to protect his investments. 
In literature, the problem of repudiation has been mainly 
tackled in the electronic transactions context. A transaction is a 
one-shot information exchange which can be defined as 
transferring of a message from A to B [2]. Transactions’ security 
is useful in digital contract signing, e-commerce, or electronic 
voting, in which communicating parties may try to cheat each 
other. The issue of transactions’ non-repudiation is usually 
addressed exploiting digital signatures and many protocols have 
been proposed so far [1], [2]. In order to perform a digital 
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signature, users need to keep secret their private key. It can be 
stored on a computer, or more frequently on a smart card or 
USB device, and protected by a secret (password, or PIN). Items 
and secrets must not be stolen, lost or forgotten. But what 
happens if the information which needs to be signed is not a 
single transaction but a continuous information flow? For 
instance, the access to the private area on a web service for 
online banking, VoIP [23], [24] calls in case of verbal contracts 
signing, etc. may also benefit from non-repudiation. Asking for 
the password or secret for each single transaction would 
drastically reduce the usability of the service, and may end up 
frustrating the user. Conversely, requesting the secret only at 
the first login does not guarantee authenticity of the user for the 
whole session. For applications in which the communication is 
confidential, or involves information regarding assets which 
need to be protected with high assurance, authentication has to 
be repeated frequently. Otherwise, insiders may be able to 
interfere, taking advantage of the parties, or causing errors and 
consequent disputes hard to be solved. 
In those cases, new solutions are necessary in order to 
provide a non-repudiation service for the entire duration of the 
session: there is a need for a continuous non-repudiation service. 
Two research questions arise here. Can continuous 
authentication mechanisms be complemented with non-
repudiation? Does biometric authentication provide sufficient 
and undeniable evidence of user’s participation in an action? 
Our contribution. In this paper we address the problem of 
continuous non-repudiation through multi-biometric 
continuous verification of identities, searching an answer to 
the above research questions.  
We choose the approach of [3] for multi-biometric 
continuous authentication as a starting point, because it is 
sufficiently general and is one of the few solutions in literature 
which improve security of the user session without reducing 
usability [38]. The idea is to introduce in its architecture and in 
its protocol the modifications needed to provide also 
continuous non-repudiation.  
We propose two alternative solutions: one called DS-CNR 
(Digital Signature based Continuous Non-Repudiation), and 
another called BS-CNR (Biometric Signature based Continuous 
Non-Repudiation). They mainly differ in the generation and 
handling of the cryptographic keys and in the underlying 
architecture. We assume that the communications between the 
entities are encrypted, and the involved third parties are 
trustable. Under the stated assumptions, both solutions offer a 
non-repudiation service for a continuous information flow 
scenario between a client and a remote internet service, 
protecting both parties for the whole duration of the session.  
We also show that in literature algorithms already exist 
that possess high verification accuracy. In our opinion, if those 
algorithms are properly integrated in a multi-biometric system, 
and possibly coupled with other security mechanism, 
biometrics is ready to offer non-repudiation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces the background of our work, presenting the basic 
definitions related to the subjects of non-repudiation and 
biometric authentication. In Section 3, we first discuss the 
possibility of providing non-repudiation through biometrics, 
surveying related works which show that it is still an open 
question; then we illustrate the CASHMA multi-biometric 
continuous authentication system which is our reference to 
build the solutions presented in this paper. Section 4 and 
Section 5 describe the protocols, the architectures and exposes 
some security considerations of DS-CNR and BS-CNR 
respectively. Section 6 presents a sample scenario in which the 
solutions can be applied; then discusses the impact of False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR) for non-repudiation in that case study, 
and analyzes the security provided by BS-CNR solution for it. 
Finally, in Section 7 we draw conclusions and discuss future 
works. 
2 BACKGROUND 
In this section, we present some basic concepts dealing with 
non-repudiation, its goal and the standard mechanism to 
provide it. We also give preliminary definitions about 
biometric authentication systems that will be used through the 
remaining of the paper to describe the protocols and the 
related architectures. 
2.1 Basics on Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation provides the capability to determine 
whether a given individual or entity took a particular action 
[5]. 
Typically, non-repudiation protects individuals against: (i) 
authors, repudiating having authored particular documents; (ii) 
messages senders, denying having transmitted messages; (iii) 
messages receivers, denying messages reception; or (iv) 
signatories, repudiating their signature on documents. Thus, 
non-repudiation services can be used to determine if 
information originated from a particular individual, or if an 
individual took specific actions (e.g., send an email, sign a 
contract, approve a procurement request) or received specific 
information [5]. 
The goal of the non-repudiation service is to generate, 
collect, maintain, make available and validate evidence 
concerning a claimed event or action in order to resolve 
disputes about the occurrence or not occurrence of the event or 
action. Such evidence is an essential object, and may be 
produced either directly by an end entity or involving a Trusted 
Third Party (TTP) [6]. In order to obtain non-repudiation 
services, organizations employ various techniques or 
mechanisms; the most common is digital signature [25]. 
Regarding transactions, assuming that an entity A wishes to 
send a message M to entity B, typical disputes that may arise 
are (Figure 1): 
 Repudiation of Origin. B claims that it received M 
from A, while A denies sending it;  
 Repudiation of Delivery. A claims that it has sent M to 
B, while B denies having received it. 
Then, we also mention two additional disputes that may 
exist in case a delivery authority is involved: Repudiation of 
Submission and Repudiation of Transmission [6]. 
According to the existing standard, two different 
mechanisms for non-repudiation are distinguished [6]. An 
NRO (Non-Repudiation of Origin) token is used to provide 
Figure 1: Standard non-repudiation approaches for the 
transaction scenario, image adapted from [6]. 
  
 3 
protection against A’s false denial of having originated the 
message. It is generated by A (or by the TTP), sent by A to B, 
and stored by B after verification of its validity. An NRD (Non-
Repudiation of Delivery) token, instead, is used to provide 
protection against the B’s false denial of having received and 
recognized the content of the message. It is generated by B (or 
by the TTP), sent to A, and stored by A after verification of its 
validity. If TTP is involved (optional), it must keep all NRO 
tokens generated and record whether or not each of NRO 
token is used to generate a NRD token. 
For electronic transactions, the evidences (non-repudiation 
tokens) are created using digital signatures. A knows its own 
public key certificate and the associated private key, B knows 
its own public key certificate and associated private key, and 
the corresponding public key certificates are available to all the 
entities concerned [6].  
2.3 Basics on Biometric Authentication 
A biometric authentication system is a system for identity 
verification of individuals based on their biometric 
characteristics (also called traits). The authentication process 
consists of two steps: registration and verification. 
During the registration (also called enrollment), one or 
multiple user’s biometric traits are presented. The system 
extracts a digital reference from those characteristics, and 
generates a template, which is saved in a DB [8]. 
Verification is the validation of a user’s identity obtained by 
comparing the captured biometric with the template(s). Thus, 
an individual who wants to be recognized claims an identity, 
for instance with a user name, and the system conducts a one-
to-one comparison to determine whether the claim is true or 
not [8]. 
A biometric system can be unimodal if the verification 
exploits only one type of characteristics, or multimodal (also 
referred as multi-biometric) if it uses multiple sources of 
biometric information. A multimodal biometric system can be 
obtained integrating two or more unimodal subsystems, and the 
fusion can happen at different levels of the verification process 
[8]. Typically, subsystems comprises all the hardware/software 
elements necessary to acquire and verify the authenticity of 
one biometric trait, including sensors, comparison algorithms 
and all the facilities for data transmission and management. 
The usage of multiple traits can avoid authenticating an 
impostor in case a single biometric trait is compromised. In 
addition, it is well-known that using multiple biometric 
characteristics combined with an appropriate rule can yield a 
higher performance than using only one trait [28], [29]. We 
refer to performance of a biometric system as the achievable 
recognition accuracy and speed, the resources required to 
achieve them, and environmental factors that affect them [8]. 
During the verification, the features extracted from the new 
traits are compared with the stored templates to generate a 
matching score, which is exploited to decide on a user’s 
identity. However, the decision can sometimes be wrong, and 
the error can belong to two categories: false accept or false 
reject. Thus the two main types of errors metrics are: False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR), that is, the proportion of verification 
attempts with wrongful claims of identity that are incorrectly 
confirmed, and False Rejection Rate (FRR), that is the proportion 
of verification attempts with truthful claims of identity that are 
incorrectly denied. FAR and FRR are generally the basic 
measures of the accuracy of a biometric system [9]. 
A multi-biometric continuous authentication system 
integrates two or more subsystems that iteratively and 
transparently acquire biometric data used for the continuous 
verification of the user identity. 
We define the subsystem trust level m(Sk,t) as the probability 
that the unimodal subsystem Sk at time t does not authenticate 
an impostor (a non-legitimate user) considering the quality of 
the sensor, the accuracy of the underlying verification 
algorithm (i.e., FARk , FRRk), and the risk that the subsystem is 
intruded or the biometric trait is forged [3]. 
The user trust level g(u, t) indicates the trust placed by the 
authentication service in the user u at time t, i.e., the 
probability that the user u is a legitimate user just considering 
his behavior in terms of device utilization (e.g., time since last 
interaction with a sensor) and the time since last acquisition of 
biometric data [3]. 
We define the trust level trust(u,t) as a numeric value, 
computed by continuously evaluating the trust both in the user 
and the (biometric) subsystems used for acquiring biometric 
data. It describes the belief that at time t the user u is actually a 
legitimate user of the system, considering the combination of 
all subsystems trust levels and of the user trust level [3]. 
Finally, the trust threshold trustmin is a lower threshold on 
the trust level required by a specific application or web service: 
the higher is trustmin, the higher are the security requirements. 
If the resulting trust level at time t is smaller than trustmin, (i.e., 
trust(u,t) <trustmin), the user u is not allowed to access to the 
service. Otherwise if trust(u,t) ≥ trustmin the user u is 
authenticated and is granted access to the service [3]. 
3 RELATED WORKS 
This section presents an analysis of non-repudiation 
through biometrics, showing that it is an open question; then it 
describes the CASHMA multi-biometric authentication system 
that we use as reference to build the solutions presented in this 
paper. 
3.1 Multi-Biometric Verification for Non-
Repudiation of Remote Services 
For biometrics, as for all the other authentication 
mechanisms, non-repudiation depends on [10]: (i) the ability of 
the selected traits to discriminate between individuals; (ii) the 
strength of binding between the trait and the individual in 
question; (iii) technical and procedural vulnerabilities that 
could undermine the intrinsic strength of the binding. The 
discrimination capabilities of biometrics depend on the 
technology used and on other application-related factors, that 
are quantified in terms of error rates (FAR and FRR). According 
to [9], unlike passwords and tokens, biometrics -because of its 
strong binding to a specific person- is the only authentication 
factor capable of guaranteeing that authentication cannot 
subsequently be denied by a user. 
Despite biometric traits are sometimes presented in the 
computer security literature as an authentication factor that 
may solve the repudiation problem [9], [10], other works like 
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[11] and [12] draw a completely different conclusion: according 
to their authors, biometrics is not a security mechanism able to 
provide non-repudiation. Analyzing the state of the art, we can 
state that answers to this research question are contradictory.  
However, the situation changes [13], [27], [30] if biometric 
authentication is coupled with another security mechanism 
like digital signature, which is commonly considered as the 
standard approach to achieve non-repudiation [6]. In fact, 
public key infrastructure, or PKI, and biometrics can well 
complement each other in many security applications, giving 
birth to biometric cryptosystems [12], [15] and to the so-called 
biometric signature [27], [30]. 
Biometric signature is defined as the process to derive a 
private key from a biometric trait and use the private key to 
sign an e-document. According to [13], this eliminates the 
problem of vulnerability of private key storage, which resolves 
the key management issue. The dynamically generated private 
key lets the user to perform signatures without carrying a disk 
or smart card [13]. One example is [30], in which the authors 
propose a fingerprint based signature scheme that uses a 
biometric trait to generate a key string, and then exploits the 
string to create a public key and the corresponding private key. 
The analysis of the state of the art shows that no solutions 
capable of providing multi-biometric continuous non-
repudiation of remote services exist. To our knowledge, our 
paper is the first in this field. It is based on: 
- Multi-biometrics, which as discussed in Section 2.3 solves 
the problem of authentication factor loss or steal. It can 
also avoid authenticating an impostor in case a single 
biometric trait is forged or compromised, and yield a 
higher performance than using only one trait. 
- Continuous authentication, to guarantee the actual 
presence of the user of the system/device. Noteworthy, we 
exploit authentication as a requirement for non-
repudiation: our solution binds the generated evidence of 
an action to the user identity only if identity verification is 
successful. 
- Digital signature (for both the solutions we propose in the 
paper) and biometric signature (for the BS-CNR), 
continuously applied for the whole duration of session in 
which a user remotely accesses an Internet service. 
3.2 The CASHMA Approach for Continuous 
Multi-Biometric Authentication 
The CASHMA [3] approach for multi-biometric continuous 
authentication is our starting point. The motivation of this 
choice is the generality of the solution: it is applicable to 
several kinds of internet services. Moreover, while alternatives 
do exist in literature [16] - [21], CASHMA is one of the few 
approaches which realizes remote and transparent multi-
biometric authentication improving security of the user session 
without significantly reducing usability [38]. 
The protocol computes an adaptive timeout (of length Ti) on 
the basis of the trust posed in the user activity –considering 
trust (u,t) and trustmin-, and in the quality and kind of biometric 
data transparently acquired during their activity. The overall 
system, shown in Figure 2, is composed of the CASHMA 
authentication service, the clients and the web services, 
connected through secure communication channels. 
The CASHMA authentication service includes: i) an 
authentication server, which interacts with the clients, ii) a set 
of high-performing computational servers that perform 
comparisons of biometric data for verification of the enrolled 
users, and iii) databases of templates that contain the biometric 
templates of the enrolled users (these are required for user 
authentication/verification). The web services are the various 
services that subscribed to the CASHMA authentication service 
and demand the authentication of enrolled users to the 
CASHMA authentication server. These services are potentially 
any kind of Internet service or application with requirements 
on user authenticity.  
Clients are the users’ devices that acquire the biometric 
raw data corresponding to the various biometric traits from the 
users, and transmit those data to the CASHMA authentication 
server as part of the authentication procedure towards the 
target web service. 
The CASHMA authentication server is in charge to 
transmit a certificate to the client. The certificate is composed 
by the following information: i) Timestamp and sequence 
number useful to univocally identify each certificate, and to 
protect from replay attacks; ii) ID is the user ID, e.g., a number; 
iii) Decision represents the outcome of the verification 
procedure carried out on the server side; iv) Expiration time of 
the session - the absolute instant of time at which the session 
should expire-, dynamically assigned by the CASHMA 
authentication server. 
 The execution of the protocol is composed of two 
consecutive phases: the initial phase (see Figure 3, [3]), and the 
maintenance phase.  
Initial phase. This phase is structured as follows: 
Step 0 - The user (the client) contacts the web service for a 
service request. The web service replies that a valid certificate 
from the CASHMA authentication service is required for 
authentication. 
Step 1 - Using the CASHMA application, the client contacts 
the CASHMA authentication server. The first step consists in 
acquiring and sending at time t0 the data for the different 
biometric traits, specifically selected to perform a strong 
authentication procedure. The application explicitly indicates 
to the user the biometric traits to be provided and possible 
retries. 
Figure 2: Overall view of the CASHMA architecture [3]. 
Figure 3: Initial phase of CASHMA protocol in case of 
successful user authentication [3]. 
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Step 2 - The CASHMA authentication server analyzes the 
biometric data received and performs an authentication 
procedure. Two different possibilities arise here. If the user 
identity is not verified (the trust level is below the trust 
threshold trustmin), new or additional biometric data are 
requested (back to Step 1) until the minimum trust threshold 
trustmin is reached. Instead, if the user identity is successfully 
verified, the CASHMA authentication server authenticates the 
user, computes an initial timeout of length T0 for the user 
session, sets the expiration time at T0+t0, creates the CASHMA 
certificate and sends it to the client.  
Step 3 - The client forwards the CASHMA certificate to the 
web service coupling it with its request. 
Step 4 - The web service reads the certificate and authorizes 
the client to use the requested service until expiration time. 
The maintenance phase is composed of three steps, analogous 
to Step 1, Step 2 and Step 3, repeated iteratively [3]. 
All the channels between the components of CASHMA 
architecture are encrypted with Secure Sockets Layer (SSL/TLS). 
Thus, the communication is protected against replay attacks 
using the Message Authentication Code (MAC) [31]. Biometric 
data, even if it is transmitted in raw format from client to the 
CASHMA authentication service, is not stored on the client: 
the templates are stored on the CASHMA authentication 
service side (Figure 2) [3]. 
4 DS-CNR: DIGITAL SIGNATURE FOR 
CONTINUOUS NON-REPUDIATION 
In order to continuously provide non-repudiation, our idea 
is to introduce digital signature in the biometric continuous 
authentication system designed in [3]. We believe that 
biometrics and digital signature are two security mechanisms 
that well complement each other. In fact, biometric continuous 
authentication contributes to strengthen authentication. Vice 
versa, as discussed in Section 3.1, it’s not so clear if, and to 
which extent, biometric authentication provides non-
repudiation if employed alone. As remark, the qualitative risk 
assessment of CASHMA system conducted in [14] highlighted 
that the introduction of digital signature is an effective 
countermeasure to several threats, -as spoofing, forgery, or 
message corruption- not only for repudiation. 
4.1 The Architecture 
The overall system, shown in Figure 4, is obtained from 
CASHMA (Figure 2) adding a Certification Authority (CA), as 
featured by many PKI schemes. The other main entities that 
compose the system are: an Authentication Server, the clients 
and the web services. All of them are connected through SSL. 
The CA provides digital certificates in order to certify the 
ownership of a public key by each client and to guarantee that 
the client has sole control and access to the corresponding 
private key. We denote the couple of cryptographic keys as K-c 
and K+c, being the client’s private and public key respectively, 
certified by the CA. We also assume that the Authentication 
Server has its own couple of keys: K-AS and K
+
AS. 
As in [3], the Authentication Server is in charge of 
transmitting a certificate, called DS-CNR certificate, to the 
client. As for the CASHMA certificate in [3], the DS-CNR 
certificate is composed of: 
Time stamp, sequence number, ID, Decision, expiration time. 
The Decision represents the outcome of the verification 
procedure carried out on the server side, and as in [3] the user 
is not considered legitimate if the trust level is below trustmin. 
The higher is trustmin, the higher are the security requirements 
of a specific application or web service. Note that, differently 
from [3], trustmin varies during the same session depending on 
the criticality of the operation that the client is asking to 
perform on a specific moment. 
Further, we introduce two databases of evidences: one is for 
the storage of the messages received by the Authentication 
Server and the related signatures, while the other contains the 
digital signatures of all the requests and DS-CNR certificates 
received by the web service. 
The other elements in Figure 4 are: high-performing 
computational servers that perform comparisons of biometric 
data for verification of the enrolled users, and databases of 
templates containing the biometric templates of the enrolled 
users. 
4.2 The Protocol 
During the registration phase, the client provides the 
selected biometric traits that are stored by the Authentication 
Server. 
We propose a continuous non-repudiation protocol (shown 
in Figure 5) integrating the digital signature in the existing 
CASHMA protocol. In detail, two different signatures are used 
during Steps 1 and 3 (and during the maintenance phase on 
Steps 5 and 7). The following description highlights the 
differences between the new version of the protocol and the 
original one, discussed in Section 3.2. 
Initial phase. This phase, shown in Figure 5, is now structured 
as follows: 
First of all, exploiting the client’s private key K-c, the 
application on client side performs the signature S1 of the 
message containing the biometric traits of the user. 
Step 1 – The message M1 with the biometric traits sent at 
this step is concatenated with its signature S1. The resulting 
message is then sent after adding a further encryption layer 
obtained using the Authentication Server public key K+AS. 
Step 2 - The Authentication Server is the only entity able to 
decrypt the message, using its private key K-AS. Then it 
analyzes the biometric traits received and performs the 
authentication procedure as usual. As in [3], the user is not 
considered legitimate if the trust level is below the trust 
threshold trustmin. In DS-CNR protocol, depending on the 
Figure 4: Overall view of the DS-CNR architecture. 
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criticality of the action to be performed, the trustmin threshold 
may vary during the same session, and the Decision is directly 
influenced.  
 If the user identity is successfully verified, the server 
authenticates the user, computes an initial timeout of length T0 
for the user session, sets the expiration time at T0+t0, creates 
the DS-CNR certificate and sends it to the client. The 
Authentication Server also stores the received message M1 and 
its signature S1 in its database of evidences: these data can be 
accessed to solve possible disagreements between client and 
web service providers. In this way, the Authentication Server 
can act as a Trusted Third Party. 
At the end of Step 2, exploiting the client’s private key K-c, 
the client performs the signature S2 of the message M2, 
containing request and DS-CNR certificate. 
Step 3 - The client forwards M2 to the web service 
concatenating it with its signature S2, which constitutes the 
NRO token. In fact, the web service stores M2 and S2 (the NRO 
token) in its database of evidences. This solves disagreements; 
in particular it protects the web service providers against 
repudiation of origin. 
Step 4 - As in [3], the web service reads the certificate and 
authorizes the client to use the requested service until 
expiration time. The client stores the message received on Step 
4, which constitutes a NRD token and protects it from 
disagreements with the web service. 
A maintenance phase is then started. It is composed of four 
steps (Steps 5-8), analogous to Steps 1-4 of Figure 5. This phase 
is repeated iteratively: the client sends fresh biometric traits 
(Step 5), the server repeats the identity verification, takes the 
related Decision, renews the certificate and saves the evidences 
(Step 6); the client sends the new request and certificate to the 
web service, in order to have the timeout expiration postponed 
by the web service (Step 7); the web service stores the NRO 
token and then sends back the “access granted until timeout” 
confirmation, which is saved by the client and constitutes the 
NRD (Step 8). 
4.3 Security Considerations 
As discussed in Section 3.2, we assume that all data 
exchanged with this protocol are transmitted using SSL, that 
has been designed to provide privacy and data integrity 
between communicating parties [31]. However, SSL cannot 
protect against the insecurities introduced into the client 
system: if the user leaves his/her computer logged in to a 
secure web service and someone gets possession of the client 
computer without permission, the SSL protocol cannot protect 
him. For this reason, the continuous authentication protocol is 
necessary to guarantee the authenticity of the user. 
In addition, even if SSL -exploiting a MAC- can guarantee 
that a message has not been changed during its transmission, it 
cannot provide non-repudiation. In our protocol, this is 
obtained with the integration of digital signatures in the 
communications where sensitive data is exposed. 
In other words, the protocol is now able to continuously 
guarantee user authenticity (thanks to multi-biometric 
authentication), privacy and data integrity (thanks to the 
SSL/TLS based communications) and non-repudiation (thanks 
to digital signature) of the exchanged messages. 
Non-repudiation is obtained digitally signing the messages 
from client to Authentication Server (Steps 2 and 6), and the 
messages from client to web service (Steps 3 and 7) and back 
(Steps 4 and 8). With this solution, if a client tries to deny 
having accessed a web service, a judge can ask to the web 
service for the client’s message M2 –that contains request and 
certificate- and the related signature S2; then retrieve the client 
public key K+c from the Certification Authority and compare 
the signed message with the original one to verify if the 
signature is valid or not and. In other words, consulting the 
evidence (NRO token) the judge establishes if the client is lying 
or not. Similarly, the NRD token and the help of the 
Authentication Server, (which has M1 and S1 stored) are the 
evidences that can protect the client from eventual disputes 
with the web server. 
In general, in a direct digital signature scheme, which 
means without the participation of a TTP, non-repudiation 
depends on the security of the sender’s private key. If a sender 
wishes to deny the access, the sender can claim that the private 
key was lost or stolen and that someone else forged his/her 
signature [26]. The solution we proposed in this section tackles 
this vulnerability but still does not eliminate it completely. In 
fact, in DS-CNR the digital signature only works as long as the 
private key K-c remains secret. However, if the key is disclosed 
(or the client discloses it itself), an attacker can produce the 
signature S1 only if it also possesses the biometric traits of the 
user. Similarly, the signature S2 can be forged only if the 
attacker possesses a valid DS-CNR certificate, which contains a 
new sequence number and in which the expiration time has not 
been reached yet. 
With the DS-CNR solution, the problem of usability of 
continuous non-repudiation is solved. In fact, even if the client 
has its private key stored on an external device, it does not need 
to provide a password or secret for each single transaction. It is 
sufficient to insert the secret only at the first login, without 
losing security: thanks to the multi-biometric identity 
verification, a secure authentication is guaranteed for the whole 
session. If, instead, the private key is stored on the client main 
computer/device, the multi-biometric continuous authentication 
will guarantee protection against insiders. In fact, even if an 
attacker succeeds in violating the client computer or device, it 
still has to continuously send multiple biometric traits to the 
Authentication Server if desires to access the web service and 
perform the operations that it offers. 
In other words, without the multi-biometric authentication, 
the continuous non-repudiation would not be possible at the 
same degrees of usability and security. 
5 BS-CNR: BIOMETRIC SIGNATURE FOR 
CONTINUOUS NON-REPUDIATION 
To address the problem of private key loss [26], we present 
an alternative solution based on biometric signature. 
Figure 5: Initial Phase of DS-CNR protocol in case of 
successful identity verification. 
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The literature largely investigated [12], [13], [15], [27], [30] 
biometric signature as a process to derive a private key from a 
biometric sample and use the key to digitally sign a document 
or a message. We exploit biometric signature to prevent 
client’s claim of having loss the private key or that the key has 
been stolen. The idea is to generate a new, additional, private 
key, denoted as BioK-c, during the first iteration (Initial Phase) 
of the protocol. Analogously, the corresponding public key 
BioK+c should be generated concurrently. 
The advantage is that the client does not store the private 
key when the session terminates, because it is valid for only 
one session, and assuming that the key is securely transmitted 
through SSL, it cannot claim that it has been lost or stolen. In 
addition, the <BioK+c, BioK
-
c> keys pair is generated only if the 
user identity is verified (the trust level trust(u, t) is above the 
trustmin threshold). 
5.1 The Architecture 
The overall architecture of the BS-CNR system is shown in 
Figure 7. The main difference with DS-CNR is that for BS-CNR 
the Authentication Server is also responsible for the generation 
of a couple of biometric-derived keys <BioK+c, BioK
-
c> for each 
client during the initial phase of the protocol. 
The remainder of the architecture does not change from 
what discussed in Section 4.1. As in DS-CNR, an external 
Certification Authority is involved, which provides digital 
certificates in order to certify the ownership of the couple of 
cryptographic keys K-c and K
+
c by the client. We also assume 
that the Authentication Server has its own couple of keys K-AS 
and K+AS. The other entities are: an Authentication Server, the 
clients and the web services. All of them are connected through 
SSL. Again, the other elements in Figure 7 are a set of high-
performing computational servers for the biometric traits 
comparison useful for verification of the enrolled users, and 
databases of templates containing the biometric templates of 
the enrolled users. 
As in the solution of Section 4, the BS-CNR certificate is 
composed of: 
Time stamp, sequence number, ID, Decision, expiration time. 
Finally, the considerations of Section 4.1 about the Decision 
are still valid here: trustmin varies during the same session 
depending on the criticality of the operation that the client is 
asking to perform on the web service on a specific moment. 
5.2 The Protocol 
During the registration phase, the client provides the 
selected biometric traits that are stored by the Authentication 
Server. 
In this protocol, the Authentication Server exploits the 
biometric traits not only for user identity verification, but also 
to generate a couple of cryptographic keys <BioK+c , BioK
-
c>, 
following one of the existing approaches e.g., from [13], [27]. 
Initial phase. This phase, shown in Figure 6, is now structured 
as follows: 
First of all, exploiting the client’s private key K-c, the 
application on client side performs the signature S1 of the 
message containing the biometric traits of the user. 
Step 1 – The message M1 with the biometric traits sent at 
this step is concatenated with its signature S1. The resulting 
message is then sent after adding a further encryption layer 
obtained using the Authentication Server public key K+AS. 
Step 2 - The Authentication Server decrypts M1 with its 
private key K-AS. Then it analyzes the biometric traits received 
and performs the authentication procedure as usual. As in DS-
CNR, depending on the criticality of the action to be 
performed, the security requirements can demand a trust 
threshold trustmin set to significantly high values. So, during 
the same session, the threshold varies based on the operation 
that the client is going to accomplish, and the Decision is 
directly influenced.  
If the criteria are not completely satisfied (the message in 
incomplete or the trust is below the threshold), the user is 
forced to return to Step 1. 
Instead, if the user identity is successfully verified, the 
server authenticates the user, computes an initial timeout of 
length T0, sets the expiration time at T0+t0, and creates the BS-
CNR certificate. Then, the Authentication Server derives the 
<BioK+c, BioK
-
c> couple from the biometric traits. Together 
with M1 and S1, it also stores the key pair in its database of 
evidences: these data can be accessed to solve possible 
disagreements between clients and web service providers. In 
this way, the Authentication Server can act as a Trusted Third 
Party. 
The Authentication Server sends to the client a message 
containing the BS-CNR certificate, and also the couple of 
biometric keys <BioK+c, BioK
-
c > assigned to the user for this 
session. 
Figure 7: Overall view of the BS-CNR architecture. 




At the end of Step 2, the client, using its new private key 
BioK-c, computes S2. It is the digital signature of the message 
M2, which is composed of: the request, the BS-CNR certificate, 
the public key BioK+c, and the biometric traits. 
Step 3 - The client forwards M2 to the web service 
concatenating it with the signature S2 which constitutes the 
NRO token. The web service reads the BS-CNR certificate and 
verifies its validity: it also checks if the BioK+c has been already 
used before the current session. The web service stores M2 and 
S2 (the NRO token) in its database of evidences. This may be 
used to solve disagreements, in particular protects the web 
service providers against repudiation of origin. 
Step 4 - As in [3] and in DS-CNR, the web service reads the 
certificate and authorizes the client to use the requested service 
until expiration time. On its side, the client stores the message 
received on Step 4, which constitutes a NRD token and protects 
it from disagreements with the web service. 
As in DS-CNR, after the initial phase there is a Maintenance 
Phase composed of four steps (Steps 5-8), analogous to Steps 1-
4 of Figure 6. This phase is repeated iteratively: the client sends 
fresh biometric traits (Step 5), the server repeats the identity 
verification, takes the related Decision, renews the certificate 
and stores the evidences (Step 6); the client sends the new 
request and certificate to the web service, in order to have the 
timeout expiration postponed by the web service (Step 7); the 
Web service stores the NRO token and then sends back the 
“access granted until timeout” confirmation, which is saved by 
the client and constitutes the NRD (Step 8). 
Note that the <BioK+c , BioK
-
c> couple is generated (and 
stored) only during Steps 1-2 of the Initial Phase: these 
operations are not repeated during the Maintenance Phase. 
5.3 Security Considerations 
This solution addresses the problem of continuous non-
repudiation trying to reduce the weaknesses showed by the 
DS-CNR, including the potential claim of private key loss by 
the client. This solution introduces a strong binding between 
the private key and the client: BioK-c is generated in case of 
successful identity verification only through the biometric 
traits. 
In addition, the key couple can be considered as one-time 
keys, which remains valid only for one session. However, after 
the expiration of the <BioK+c, BioK
-
c> keys, the web service or 
a judge can still use the BioK+c to compare the message M2 and 
its signature S2, thus guaranteeing non-repudiation of the 
access. What cannot be done with these keys is using a private 
key for more than one session: in this way the client cannot 
repudiate having accessed the web service. In fact, if a couple 
of keys <BioK+c, BioK
-
c> is used for more than one session to 
send a request to the web service (Step 3), the web service 
would receive a message M2 with a BioK
+
c key that is already 
stored, and would deny the access. 
Also in this protocol we assume that the transmissions are 
protected by SSL protocol, so that the privacy and the integrity 
of the information exchanged are guaranteed. For this solution, 
privacy is even more important because the message M2 
contains also the biometric traits of the user. This choice has 
been made to give even more strength to the NRO token stored 
by the web service. However, to protect the client biometrics, 
their templates are not sent to the web service in raw format: 
they are transformed using client specific parameters [40]. 
Apart from security, we also consider that the 
computational and storage resources needed are higher with 
respect to the previous solution: the Authentication Server 
generates a couple of biometric-based keys for each client, once 
for each session. Further, it stores the <BioK+c, BioK
-
c> couple 
with the corresponding certificates in case a TTP is requested 
to solve future disputes. 
6 AN ONLINE BANKING SCENARIO AND 
ITS SECURITY ANALYSIS 
The two solutions presented in this paper are general 
enough to guarantee a non-repudiation service for many 
scenarios in which users and remote Internet services are 
involved in a continuous information flow. 
In the following, we present a detailed description of how 
the BS-CNR is applied in a sample application scenario (Section 
6.1) in order to prevent repudiation from a customer (Section 
6.2.1) and from an online banking service operator (Section 
6.2.2). The same analysis, which we do not report here for 
space constraints, can be easily performed also for DS-CNR. 
6.1 BS-CNR System Design and Assumptions 
Let us consider an online banking service which 
distinguishes between Risky Actions (RAn) and Basic Actions 
(BAn). An example of risky action is RA1: transferring an 
amount of money that exceeds a specified value (e.g., five 
thousand dollars) to an account of a different bank and/or 
belonging to a different customer. An example of basic action 
is BA1: consulting services. The online banking service exploits 
BS-CNR to permit Risky Actions only to the legitimate client 
which is highly trusted. That is, in order to get a valid BS-CNR 
certificate, the trustmin threshold required by the 
Authentication Server is set to a relatively high value. Instead, 
the trustmin threshold is set to a lower value in order to get a 
BS-CNR certificate valid to perform Basic Actions. 
We assume a customer intends to perform operations on its 
online banking account. The customer has been previously 
enrolled to the BS-CNR system. 
On the client side, the customer device is a desktop 
computer which integrates a webcam for the acquisition of face 
and iris traits, and a mouse with an optical scanner for the 
acquisition of fingerprints [43]. 
We assume that on the Authentication Server the BS-CNR 
system depends on Sys1, Sys2, and Sys2, being respectively 
three subsystems with the state-of-the-art biometric 
verification algorithms: 
 Sys1 with Google FaceNet [32], for face recognition, 
which showed at FAR 10-6 a True Acceptance Rate 
(TAR) of 86.473% in Megaface challenge [33], and the 
impressive accuracy result of 99.63%±0.09 in LFW 
benchmark [34]; 
 Sys2 with IRITECH algorithm for iris recognition, which 
showed at FAR 10-6 a FRR of 0.002 in the context of 
NIST Iris Exchange IREX I [35]; 
 Sys3 with Neurotechnology algorithm for fingerprint 
recognition, which had at FAR≤ 10−2 a FRR of 0.083 in 
the FVC-onGoing online evaluation [36]. 
Thus the subsystems possess a relatively high subsystem 
trust level m(Sk,t0) thanks to their low FARk. 
If during an iteration of the protocol the client wants to 
perform a Risky Action (RAn) but the Authentication Server 
does not provide the BS-CNR certificate, the action would not 
be permitted. If it happens when the operation is already 
ongoing, because during the previous iteration it has been 
permitted, the operation will be aborted. 
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6.2 Repudiation Attempts and Security 
Analysis 
Before describing two repudiation attempts and performing 
the security analysis, we summarize the assumptions under 
which the analysis is conducted. The assumptions are: (i) all the 
communications between the entities are secure (e.g., under 
SSL/TLS); (ii) the Authentication Server and the Certification 
Authority are both Trusted Third Parties; (iii) the subsystems 
Sys1, Sys2, and Sys2  adopt specific anti-spoofing and liveness 
detection measures so that the biometric traits are not 
forgeable.  
The following analysis considers only attacks in terms of 
fraudulent behaviors of the parties and describes how the BS-
CNR solution neutralizes them guaranteeing non-repudiation. 
In the future works, starting from the analysis of [14], we are 
going to consider also cyber-attacks, with a model-based, 
quantitative security evaluation of both DS-CNR and BS-CNR. 
6.2.1 Fraudulent Customer. Consider the situation in 
which a customer sends money to a second account, then 
denies the transaction and asks for a refund in order to 
deliberately fraud the bank. 
At time ti, the Step 2 of the protocol has been just 
completed, the Authentication Server verified the identity of 
the user, produced a BS-CNR certificate containing a timeout 
of Ti=20 seconds (s), thus setting the expiration time at ti+Ti. 
The customer sends a RA1 action request, providing on Step 3 
all the data needed. The banking service checks the validity of 
the certificate, of the BioK+c key, and grants the operation until 
ti+Ti is reached. The customer spends more than 20s to 
complete the RA1 operation, but the BS-CNR protocol 
continuously verifies the user identity and checks if trust(u, t) 
is always above the trustmin threshold requested by the web 
service to perform RA1 operations. Otherwise, the operation is 
aborted. In this example, the expiration time is extended, and 
the customer is able to complete the operation. 
A short time later, the customer repudiates the transaction, 
claims having been robbed and asks for the judge intervention 
in order to get a refund. 
The online banking service is protected against this 
attempt of repudiation: it can provide the NRO token received 
on Step 3 (and Step 7) of the protocol. This protection also 
invalidates a possible claim of private key loss by the user: the 
Authentication Server can provide the evidences stored at the 
end of Step 1, showing that the private key BioK-c has been 
generated on that moment and cannot be used during 
subsequent sessions. Moreover, even assuming the loss of the 
private key, if all Sys1, Sys2, and Sys3 subsystems have 
successfully verified the user, the probability that the multi-
biometric system has authenticated an impostor is: 
P(FAsystem) =P(FA1) ∩P(FA2) ∩P(FA3) = 10−14 ≈ 2−46. 
Its value is comparable with the probability of inverting 
2048-bit RSA used for digital signature, which is ≤ 2−60[37]. 
Thus, we believe that biometrics constitutes an important 
additional layer of security, and the P(FAsystem)  value is 
sufficiently low to cause the customer’s attempt of repudiation 
to be useless.  
Besides, such a claim would be counter-productive if an 
investigation discovers the fraud attempt. 
6.2.2 Fraudulent Banking Operator. Let us examine the 
opposite situation, with a dishonest operator of the online 
banking service, which somehow obtains access to the money 
transferring system. We assume the bank employee succeeds in 
sending 20 thousand dollars to his own account from the one 
of a customer. The customer who has been ripped off asks for a 
refund and for the judge intervention. When questioned, the 
online banking service is not able to produce a valid NRO 
token (S2 and M2 evidences), related to a hypothetical RA1 
operation executed by the customer on that time interval. Thus 
the judge solves the dispute in favor of the innocent customer 
and the bank is forced to refund. 
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
Nowadays, ICT plays an important role in our society, and 
security services are getting increasingly fundamental to 
protect users and entities involved. Non-repudiation is one of 
these services: it provides evidences of actions, protects against 
denial of involvement, and helps solving disputes between 
parties. Traditional non-repudiation mechanisms, as digital 
signature, are widely applied to prevent denial of past 
behaviors as having sent or received messages. However, if the 
information flow is continuous, evidences should be produced 
for the entirety of the flow and not only at specific points. 
Further, non-repudiation should be guaranteed by mechanisms 
that do not reduce the usability of the system or application. 
To meet these challenges, in this paper, we proposed two 
solutions for continuous non-repudiation of remote services, 
based on multi-biometric continuous authentication, 
respectively coupled with digital signature and biometric 
signature: DS-CNR, and BS-CNR. 
We choose the CASHMA approach [3] as a starting point, 
which is one of the few solutions in literature which improve 
security of the user authentication without reducing usability. 
Moreover, the CASHMA system has been evaluated both from 
quantitative [3] and qualitative [14] perspectives. In [14], the 
assessment identified the main threats both for the 
transmission and the biometric system level. The selected 
countermeasures, most of which (e.g. digital signature, avoid 
transmitting raw biometrics, biometric signature) have been 
integrated in the CNR solutions, are capable of reducing the 
risk for the detected threats. 
The DS-CNR and BS-CNR approaches are a demonstration 
that, under specific assumptions, continuous authentication 
mechanisms can actually be complemented with non-
repudiation. The proposed solutions are able to provide 
continuous non-repudiation for the entire information flow 
between a client and a remote Internet service. The NRO and 
NRD evidences generated, and the Authentication Server 
involvement, guarantee protection for both parties. 
We also showed that some biometric algorithms in 
literature already have high verification accuracy. In our 
opinion, if those algorithms (or different ones equally accurate) 
are properly integrated in a multi-biometric system, with high 
quality sensors and anti-spoofing measures, biometric-based 
continuous non-repudiation is possible. The probability of 
authenticating an impostor is relatively low and constitutes a 
first evidence of user involvement. This is particularly valid for 
traits which inherently possess high distinctiveness [8]. Then, 
coupling biometrics with other security mechanisms makes 
continuous non-repudiation very effective. 
As a future work, we are going to discuss if some 
assumptions can be relaxed and to which extent. We are also 
planning a model-based, quantitative security evaluation in 
order to assess the likelihood and impact of attacks on the 
system, under different scenarios, system settings, and 
attackers’ profiles. Models will allow quantifying the threat 
analysis available at [14]. This study will permit comparisons 
between our solutions and state-of-the-art approaches for non-
repudiation of remote services. The analysis will be performed 
integrating SAN [41], a well-known formalism for the analysis 
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of dependable systems, and ADVISE [42], a methodology for 
security evaluation. Finally, the direction of our future work is 
also to identify and realize practical case studies to better 
understand advantages and limitations of the two solutions. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This work has been partially supported by the project 
DEVASSES, funded by the European Union's Seventh 
Framework Programme for research, technological 
development and demonstration under grant agreement no 
PIRSES-GA-2013-612569, and by the FAR-FAS 2014 TOSCA-FI 
project funded by the Tuscany Region. 
REFERENCES 
[1] S. Kremer, O. Markowitch, and J. Zhou. 2002. An intensive survey of fair 
non-repudiation protocols. Computer communications, 25, 17, 1606-1621. 
[2] J. A. Onieva, J. Zhou, and J. Lopez, Multiparty nonrepudiation: A survey, 
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 41, no. 1, p. 5, 2009. 
[3] A. Ceccarelli, L. Montecchi, F. Brancati, P. Lollini, A. Marguglio, A. 
Bondavalli, “Continuous and transparent user identity verification for 
secure internet services,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure 
Computing, vol. 12, n.3, pp. 270-283, 2015. 
[4] ITU Baseline identity management terms and definitions, Recommendation 
ITU-T X.1252, April, 2010. 
[5] NIST Special Pub. 800-53 Revision 4: Security and Privacy Controls for 
Federal Information Systems and Organizations, 2013. 
[6] ISO/IEC 13888-3:2009 — Information technology — Security techniques — 
Non-repudiation — Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, 2009. 
[7] ISO/IEC 18014-2:2009 — Information technology — Security techniques — 
Time-stamping services — Part 2: Mechanisms producing independent 
tokens, 2009. 
[8] A. K. Jain, A. Ross, S. Prabhakar, An introduction to biometric recognition, 
IEEE Transactions on circuits and systems for video technology, vol. 14, n. 1, 
pp. 4-20, 2004. 
[9] S. Z. Li, Encyclopedia of Biometrics: I-Z (Vol. 1). Springer Science & Business 
Media, 2009. 
[10] H. Bidgoli, (2006). Handbook of Information Security, Information Warfare, 
Social, Legal, and International Issues and Security Foundations (Vol. 2). 
John Wiley & Sons. 
[11] D. R. Kuhn, V. C. Hu, W. T. Polk, and S. J. Chang, Introduction to public 
key technology and the federal PKI infrastructure, National Inst of 
Standards and Technology Gaithersburg MD, 2001. 
[12] A. Kholmatov, and Y., Berrin, Biometric cryptosystem using online 
signatures, Computer and Information Sciences–ISCIS 2006. Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2006. 981-990. 
[13] H. Feng, and C. Choong Wah, Private key generation from on-line 
handwritten signatures, Information Management & Computer Security 10.4 
(2002): 159-164. 
[14] E. Schiavone, A. Ceccarelli, A. Bondavalli, Risk Assessment of a Biometric 
Continuous Authentication Protocol for Internet Services, in Proceedings of 
ITASEC the 1st Italian Conference on Cybersecurity, CEUR workshop 
proceedings v.1816, pp. 53-65, 2017. 
[15] C. Rathgeb, A. Uhl, A survey on biometric cryptosystems and cancelable 
biometrics, EURASIP Journal on Information Security, vol. 2011, n. 1, pp. 3, 
2011. 
[16] M. Frank, R. Biedert, E. Ma, I. Martinovic, and D. Song, (2013). 
Touchalytics: On the applicability of touchscreen input as a behavioral 
biometric for continuous authentication, IEEE transactions on information 
forensics and security, 8(1), 136-148. 
[17] T. Sim, S. Zhang, R. Janakiraman, and S. Kumar (2007). Continuous 
verification using multimodal biometrics. IEEE transactions on pattern 
analysis and machine intelligence, 29(4), 687-700. 
[18] K. Niinuma, U. Park, and A. K. Jain, (2010). Soft biometric traits for 
continuous user authentication. IEEE Transactions on information forensics 
and security, 5(4), 771-780. 
[19] P. W. Tsai, M. K. Khan, J. S. Pan, and B. Y. Liao, (2014). Interactive artificial 
bee colony supported passive continuous authentication system. IEEE 
Systems Journal, 8(2), 395-405.  
[20] A. Altinok, and M. Turk, (2003, December). Temporal integration for 
continuous multimodal biometrics. In Proceedings of the Workshop on 
Multimodal User Authentication. 
[21] M. De Marsico, C. Galdi, M. Nappi, and D. Riccio, (2014). FIRME: face and 
iris recognition for mobile engagement. Image and Vision Computing, 
32(12), 1161-1172. 
[22] R. Lieber, (2013). Disputing a Charge on Your Credit Card, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/your-money/what-happens-when-
you-dispute-a-credit-card-charge.html [online] 
[23] R. Hosie, (2017). ‘Can you hear me’ phone scam currently defrauding US 
consumers set to hit British shores, http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/can-you-hear-me-phone-scam-fraud-us-britain-police-pennsylvania-
florida-uk-a7597106.html [online] 
[24] N. Kuntze, A. U. Schmidt, and C. Hett, Non-repudiation in internet 
telephony, IFIP International Information Security Conference, pp. 361-372, 
2007. 
[25] W. Diffie, and M. Hellman, (1976). New directions in cryptography. IEEE 
transactions on Information Theory, vol. 22, n. 6, pp 644-654, 1976 
[26] W. Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security, Principles and Practice. 
5/E. Pearson Education India, 2011. 
[27] P. K. Janbandhu, and M. Y. Siyal, (2001). Novel biometric digital signatures 
for Internet-based applications. Information Management & Computer 
Security, 9(5), 205-212. 
[28] A. Ross, A. K. Jain, Information fusion in biometrics, Pattern Recognition 
Letters, 24(13), pp. 2115–2125, 2003.  
[29] L. Hong, A. K. Jain, S. Pankanti, Can Multibiometrics Improve 
Performance?, Proceedings AutoID, (99), pp. 59-64, 1999. 
[30] A. Burnett, F. Byrne, T. Dowling, and A. Duffy, (2007). A Biometric Identity 
Based Signature Scheme. IJ Network Security, 5(3), 317-326. 
[31] T. Dierks, The transport layer security (TLS) protocol version 1.2, (2008). 
[32] F. Schroff, D. Kalenichenko, and J. Philbin, (2015). Facenet: A unified 
embedding for face recognition and clustering. In Proceedings of the IEEE 
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (pp. 815-823). 
[33] I. Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, S. M. Seitz, D. Miller, and E. Brossard, (2016). 
The megaface benchmark: 1 million faces for recognition at scale. In Proc. 
of the IEEE Conf. on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (pp. 4873-
4882).  http://megaface.cs.washington.edu/ [online] 
[34] G. B. Huang, M. Ramesh, T. Berg, and E. Learned-Miller, Labeled Faces in 
the Wild: A Database for Studying Face Recognition in Unconstrained 
Environments. University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Technical Report 07-49, 
October, 2007. http://vis-www.cs.umass.edu/lfw/ [online] 
[35] P. Grother, E. Tabassi, G. Quinn, and W. Salamon, (2009). Irex I -
Performance of Iris Recognition Algorithms on Standard Images, NIST 
Interagency Report 7629. NIST Information Access Division. 
https://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/image-group/irex-i [online] 
[36] B. Dorizzi, R. Cappelli, M. Ferrara, D. Maio, D. Maltoni, N. Houmani, S. 
Garcia-Salicetti and A. Mayoue, Fingerprint and On-Line Signature 
Verification Competitions at ICB 2009, in proc. Int. Conf on Biometrics 
(ICB), Alghero, Italy, pp.725-732, June 2009. 
https://biolab.csr.unibo.it/FvcOnGoing/UI/Form/Home.aspx [online] 
[37] C. Y. Koo, N. Yakovenko, J. Blank, J. Katz, Digital Signature Schemes, 
Lecture 16 of Advanced Topics in Cryptography, 2004. 
[38] E. Schiavone, A. Ceccarelli, A. Bondavalli, and A. M. Carvalho, (2016). 
Usability Assessment in a Multi-Biometric Continuous Authentication 
System. In Dependable Computing (LADC), 2016 Seventh Latin-American 
Symposium on (pp. 43-50). IEEE. 
[39] D. Barboza, Online Brokers Fined Millions In Fraud Case, 2003. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/15/business/online-brokers-fined-
millions-in-fraud-case.html [online] 
[40] A. Nagar, K. Nandakumar, and A.K. Jain, (2010, February). Biometric 
template transformation: a security analysis. In IS&T/SPIE Electronic 
Imaging. International Society for Optics and Photonics. 
[41] W. H. Sanders, and J. F. Meyer, (2001). Stochastic Activity Networks: 
Formal definitions and concepts. In Lectures on Formal Methods and 
PerformanceAnalysis (pp. 315-343). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
[42] E. LeMay, M. D. Ford, K. Keefe, W.H. Sanders, and C. Muehrcke, (2011, 
September). Model-based security metrics using ADversary VIew Security 
Evaluation (ADVISE). In Quantitative evaluation of systems (QEST), 2011 
eighth international conference on (pp. 191-200). IEEE. 
[43] SecuGen OptiMouse Plus. http://www.secugen.com/products/po.htm 
[online] 
